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O'CONNOR v. DONALDSON: DUE PROCESS AND THE
INVOLUNTARILY CIVILLY COMMITTED
MENTAL PATIENT
INTRODUCTION

Until the decision in O'Connor v. Donaldson,' there had been no
Supreme Court ruling on the due process rights of involuntarily civilly
committed mental patients, except in cases involving criminal convictions of mentally ill persons.2 Earlier lower court decisions had held
that the mentally ill did not have the same constitutional and statutory
rights as did other persons.3
The Court in O'Connor held that mentally ill persons are entitled
to due process. Thus, to confine a person involuntarily violates due
process if it cannot be shown that he is dangerous to himself or to
others.4 This decision will affect most of the patients now in mental
institutions who were committed against their will, since very few of
them were actually found to be dangerous at the time of their commitment. The purpose of this note is to analyze the decision in O'Connor
and to consider some of the problems still remaining in the area of involuntary civil commitment.
FACTS

Donaldson was civilly committed in 1957 as a mental patient at a
Florida state hospital. During the almost fifteen years of his confinement, he repeatedly demanded his release, claiming that he was not
dangerous, that he was not mentally ill, and that the hospital had not
provided him with any treatment for his supposed mental illness. His
father and a county judge who found Donaldson to be suffering from
"paranoid schizophrenia" committed him for "care, maintenance, and
1. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
2. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
3. See Martin v. Beuter, 79 W. Va. 604, 91 S.E. 452 (1917).
4. "[A] State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of
willing and responsible family members or friends." 422 U.S. at 576.
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treatment" under Florida statutory provisions which were later repealed.'

The hospital staff had the power to release a patient who was not
dangerous, but O'Connor, the hospital administrator, refused to allow

that power to be exercised. There was uncontradicted testimony at trial
that Donaldson was not and had never been dangerous to others during
his confinement. 6 Donaldson was given no treatment, only custodial

care, although there was evidence that occasionally Donaldson, a Christian Scientist, would refuse to take medicine. 7

Donaldson originally brought his suit as a class action, to include
all of the patients in Department C at the hospital. He sought damages,
the release of the entire class, and declaratory and injunctive relief to

require that the hospital furnish satisfactory treatment. After his action
was dismissed as a class suit, Donaldson refiled seeking individual relief

alleging that defendants had acted "with intentional, malicious, and
reckless disregard of his constitutional rights." s He asked for $100,000
in damages. O'Connor claimed as a defense that the state law had
authorized indefinite confinement, even if the patients were not danger-

ous and were not being treated for their illness.
At the trial, O'Connor asked that the jury be instructed that "'if
defendants acted pursuant to a statute which was not declared unconstitutional at the time they cannot be held to be accountable for such
action.'

"

The district court judge refused to give the instruction and

5. Donaldson was committed pursuant to section 394.22(11) of the State Public
Health Code, which provided:
Whenever any person who has been adjudged mentally incompetent requires confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others, the
said judge shall direct that such person be forthwith delivered to a superintendent of a Florida state hospital, for the mentally ill, after admission has
been authorized under regulations approved by the board of commissioners of
state institutions, for care, maintenance, and treatment, as provided in sections
384.09, 394.24, 394.25, 394.26 and 394.27, or make such other disposition of
him as he may be permitted by law ....
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 566 n.2 (1975), quoting ch. 31403, § 1, [1955]
Fla. Extra. Sess. Laws 62 (repealed 1971).
The Florida statute was not clear as to whether an incompetent person was required
to be either dangerous to himself or to others. 422 U.S. at 566 n.2, quoting ch. 29902,
§ 3, [1955] Fla. Gen. Laws 835 (repealed 1971). The only statutory procedure for the
release of a person from a mental hospital required a judicial restoration of a patient's
"mental competency." 422 U.S. at 566 n.2, quoting ch. 29902, § 3, [1955] Fla. Gen.
Laws 935 (repealed 1971).
6. "O'Connor himself conceded that he had no personal or secondhand knowledge
that Donaldson had ever committed a dangerous act." 422 U.S. at 568.
7. The trial judge had instructed the jury not to award damages to Donaldson for
any period during which he refused treatment. 422 U.S. at 569 n.4.
8. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 1974).
9. 422 U.S. at 570 n.5.
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Donaldson prevailed at trial, being awarded damages of $38,500, including $10,000 in punitive damages. Tho Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed on the grounds that the fourteenth amendment guarantees a right to treatment to involuntarily civilly committed mental
10
patients.
The Supreme Court held that Donaldson's constitutional right to
freedom was violated since O'Connor had confined Donaldson while
knowing that he was not dangerous. 1 ' In the Court's view, the only
issue raised by the case was that of a person's constitutional right to
liberty.'" O'Connor held that there is no constitutional basis for the
compulsory confinement of persons who are not dangerous to anyone.18
Justice Stewart's majority opinion left open the question whether those
confined for the purpose of treatment, or those who were involuntarily
committed because they were dangerous to themselves or to others had a
right to treatment.' 4 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger
stated:
There can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to
a mental hospital, like involuntary confinement of an individual for any reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the
State cannot accomplish without due process of law...
Commitment must be justified on the basis of a legitimate
state interest, and the reasons for committing a particular
individual must be established in an appropriate proceeding.
Equally important, confinement must cease when those reasons no longer exist.15
The Fifth Circuit's judgment was vacated, however, and the case
remanded for the purpose of determining whether the jury instructions
were inadequate under Wood v. Strickland' since they did not take into
10. 493 F.2d 507, 509, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1974).
11. 422 .S. at 576.
12. Id. at 573.
13. Id. at 575.
14. Id. at 573.
15. Id. at 580 (Burger, CJ., concurring) (citation omitted).
16. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). In Wood, which dealt with the qualified immunity of
school officials, the Supreme Court said:
Mn the specific context of school discipline, we hold that a school board
member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew
or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student. . . . A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the school board member has acted with
such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the student's clearly
established constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.
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account O'Connor's claimed reliance on state law.'1 In light of Wood,
in order to hold O'Connor personally liable for monetary damages, the
jury would have had to find that O'Connor knew that his action would

result in the violation of Donaldson's constitutional rights, or that
O'Connor had a malicious intention to deprive Donaldson of his constitutional rights.' s
WHAT Is "DANGEous"?

If an individual is found to be dangerous prior to his commitment,
there is less likelihood of a due process violation.

However, a major

problem when dealing with mental health statutes is defining the term
"dangerous."' 9 Statutes and case law provide that a person who is committed involuntarily must be found to be dangerous to himself or to

others.20 The insanity must be of such a caliber that the person would
be a danger to persons or property if allowed to remain at large. 2

A person can be committed under the doctrine of parens patriae if
he is dangerous to himself and under the state's police power if he is dangerous to others. How can it be determined that a person might be

dangerous to others if he has committed no crime? How can it possibly
be determined whether a person is dangerous to himself? Most of the

existing involuntary commitment statutes do allow mentally ill persons
who are not dangerous to themselves to be confined even though there is
Id. at 322. This decision affects not only school officials but all state officials who raise
the defense of immunity to the issues of liability and the extent of any monetary
damages.
17. 422 U.S. at 577. The issue of immunity of state officials was raised since
O'Connor's principal defense was that he acted in good faith under what he believed was
valid state law. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court stated:
[S]ince Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), it has been settled that the
Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a
claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state
law.
416 U.S. at 237.
18. 422 U.S. at 577. On remand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that
part of the lower court's decision which held defendants liable for money damages. There
was error in denying the instruction concerning O'Connor's claimed reliance on state
law, and the lower court's instructions were inadequate in regard to the scope of qualified
immunity possessed by state officials. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 519 F.2d 59 (5th Cir.
1975).
19. BLACK'S LAw DIcnroNARY 479 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines "dangerous" as
"attended with risk; perilous; hazardous, unsafe."
20. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), which held that a mentally
incompetent individual must be found to be dangerous before he can be committed for an
indefinite length of time.
21. See Crawford v. Brown, 312 IlM. 305, 151 N.E. 911 (1926); Maxwell v.
Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7, 177 N.W. 541 (1920).
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no showing of whether the person lacks the capacity to evaluate the
desirability of such a restraint.2 2 The court in Lynch v. Baxley2 said:
Although he does not threaten actual violence to himself, a
person may be properly committable under the dangerousness standard if it can be shown that he is mentally ill, that his
mental illness manifests itself in negleot or refusal to care for
himself, that such neglect or refusal poses a real and present
threat of substantial harm to his well-being, and that he is
incompetent to determine for himself whether treatment for
his mental illness would be desirable.24
Related to dangerousness is the idea of preventive detention, which
has been justified as securing both the interests of the patient and
society.2 5 Society's interests, however, are based on the idea that all
persons who are mentally ill are dangerous to others and should be
preventively detained.26 Preventive detention should only be utilized, if
at all, when there is a substantial likelihood that future harmful conduct
will result.2
PARENS PATRIAE AND INCAPACITY

The parens patriae power allows a state to act as "the general
guardian of all infancts, idiots, and lunatics .
,,.s The valid exercise of parens patriae assumes legal incompetence.2 9 Parens patriae
authority is not immune from constitutional due process, however,
merely because the state has a benevolent motive. It is still required
that there be a reasonable relation between state action and a valid state
objective.3
In choosing the most advisable alternative available, one must
consider whether to compel psychiatric treatment or to force hospitaliza22. Indictum, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the only
justification for commitments to protect an individual was "on the basis of the state's
status as parens patriae." In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
23. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
24. Id. at 391.
25. Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Clu. L.
REv. 755, 758 (1969).
26. Id.
27. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 742, 749
(1969).
28. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972), quoting 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*47.

29. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
30. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
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The state as substitute decision maker must look at those

options which may be utilized and choose the one that is in the best
interests of the individual.3"

Because of the stigma attached to even

commitment3 3

and the deprivation of a person's liberty, it
short-term
should be essential that there be a material anticipated benefit in order
to allow involuntary commitment. 4
A person with a mental disorder which does not threaten his
physical health or materially damage his capacity to act in society should

seldom be forcibly hospitalized. 35 The state must establish that a
person does not have the capacity to make a decision as to what benefits
might occur if he is hospitalized.3 6
There would be no due process argument against parens patriae
commitments if all mental illnesses automatically made a person incompetent to make reasonable decisions concerning the desirability of institutionalization.3 7 There is both medical and legal acknowledgment of
the difference between mental illness and incapacity. 38 Therefore, in
order to supply the connection between statutory means and ends necessitated by due process, it seems that parens patriae commitments should
be limited to those who are both mentally ill and unable to judge the
need for psychiatric care.3 9
A mentally ill person may be just as able to judge the need for
acquiring medical treatment as a person who is physically M.40 Parens
31. Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1220 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment].
32. Id.
33. Cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Burger, C.J. concurring in
the result); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) (short term criminal
confinement).
34. Cf. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (dictum); Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414

U.S. 473 (1974).

35. Civil Commitment, supra note 31, at 1221.
36. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
37. Civil Commitment, supranote 31, at 1124.
38. BLAcK'S LAW DIcnoNAPy 1137 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines mental incapacity as
being "[e]stablished when there is found to exist an essential privation of reasoning
faculties, or when a person is incapable of understanding and acting with discretion in
the ordinary affairs of life."
39. Several commentators have suggested that incapacity rather than mental illness
be used as the standard for parens patriae commitments. See Dix, Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for a Reexamination, 51 MAIRQ. L. REv. 1, 26-27
(1967); Postel, Civil Commitment: A FunctionalAnalysis, 38 BROOKLYN L. Rnv. 1, 3337 (1971).
40. Courts have stressed that the difference in the ways the physically and mentally
ill are treated implies that a standard of incapacity is necessary to meet the requirements
of equal protection. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1094 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
(dictum), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
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patriaecommitments would be valid only as long as the patient was not
competent to make a decision regarding treatment, but once a person
became capable of making a treatment decision, he could no longer be
confined against his will except upon a finding of dangerousness. 4 '
Those commitment statutes which employ mental illness as the

criterion dividing the committable from the noncommittable would not
be able to furnish even a rational basis for such a divergence in
treatment.42 If the term "mental illness" is to be used as the criterion
for committing a person against his will, the term must communicate an
adequate legal meaning so as not to be held unconstitutionally vague.48

A statute that allows too much discretion in deciding whether a person is
mentally ill will be open to attack.44

All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes pertaining to involuntary civil commitment to mental institutions. 4' Although
41. Civil Commitment, supranote 31, at 1391.
42. See note 39 supra.
43. Civil Commitment, supra note 31, at 1256.
44. Several commitment statutes have been challenged as being unconstitutionally
vague. See Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (ED. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded
on other grounds,414 U.S. 473 (1974).
45. Eighteen jurisdictions authorize commitment only if the individual is mentally ill
and dangerous to himself or to others, or is unable to care for his physical needs. See
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-520 et seq. (1974); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5260,
5300 (West 1972); CoLo. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 27-10-106 (1973); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21545 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88.506.4-507.1 (1971); IDAHO CODE § 66-329 (Supp.
1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91%, § 1-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); IND. ANN. STAT. §
16-14-9.1-10(d) (Bums Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:52 (1975); ME. Rpy.
STAT. ANN. it. 34, § 2334 (Supp. 1975-76); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 12 (1972); MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, §§ 1, 8 (Supp. 1975); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1401
(1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.310 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:26 (Supp.
1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122.58.7 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.150
(1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4 (Supp. 1975).
Fourteen states require a person to be dangerous or in need of care or treatment. See
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.070 (1971); Aim. STAT. ANN. § 59-408 (1971); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 5125 (Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467 (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 229.1 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202.135 (1972); Miss. CODE ANN. § 4121-71 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-5 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 2503-11 (Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-955 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33604 (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
7607 (1968); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 25-60 (1967).
Five states require that a person be committed for the protection of his welfare or
the welfare of others. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-176 (1975); MNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253A.07 (Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 3 (1971); TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5547-52 (1958); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.001, 51.75 (Supp. 1975-76).
Fourteen states require a person to be mentally ill to the extent that he needs care
and treatment. See ALA. CODE lit. 45, § 205 (1959); HAwAli REV. STAT § 334-53
(1968); IoWA CODE AmN. § 229.19 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902 (Supp. 1975);
MD. ANN. STAT. §§ 202.797, 202.807 (Vernon 1972); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. H4 38.
1201 to -1202 (Supp. 1975) (requiring a person to be "developmentally disabled" and
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mental illness is required by all statutes to warrant involuntary hospitalization, most either fail to define the term or contain only a vague
definition.46

Unlike a standard of mental illness, an incapacity standard would
differentiate between the committable and the noncommitable on the

basis of a person's need to have someone else make decisions for him
and act as parens patriae in the state's interest.4 7

Subsequent to the

meeting of the requirement of incapacity, the state would be able to act
as parenspatriaefor the person.48
TREATMENT

If an individual is confined for the purpose of treatment, society's
right to deprive him of his liberty depends upon whether or not treatment is actually provided.49 When care is custodial only, society must
be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is not capable
of caring for himself.5
Rouse v. Cameron5 ' upheld a right to treatment, as did the court of
appeals in O'Connor v. Donaldson.52 Rouse held that treatment, not
needing treatment instead of "mentally ill" and needing treatment); NEB. REv. STAT. §
83-828 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-30 (Supp. 1975-76); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE
LAW §§ 31.01, 31.27 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5122.15
(1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 426.120 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN.fit.
50, § 4406 (1969); R.I.
GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 26-2-8 (Supp. 1975); S.D. Con'. LAws ANN. § 27-7-13.1 (Supp.
1975); VA.CODE ANN.§ 37.1-67.1 (Supp.1975).
46. "Many statutes define mental illness as a condition which makes commitment
appropriate and then authorize the commitment of the mentally ill. Such definitions of
mental illness add nothing to the other statutory criteria." Civil Commitment, supra
note 31, at 1202 n.5.
47. See note 34 supra.
48. Civil Commitment, supra note 31, at 1220.
49. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 742, 748
(1969).
50. Id.
51. 373 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The court held that the Hospitalization of
the Mentally fll Act, D.C. CoDE ANN. § 21-501 (1967), created a statutory right to
treatment.
52. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974). See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), on submission of proposed standards by defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341
(M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). In Wyatt the district court held that
involuntarily committed patients "unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive
such individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or
to improve his or her mental condition." 325 F. Supp. at 784.
On appeal, Circuit Judge Wisdom (who also wrote the opinion of the court of
appeals in O'Connor) stated that there was no constitutional justification for civil
commitment on the grounds that there is a "need to care" for the mentally ill and to take
this burden off families, friends, or guardians. 503 F.2d at 1313.
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punishment, is the purpose of involuntary confinement 3 A hospital
does not have to show that treatment54will actually help a patient but only
that there is an effort made to do So.
Statutory provisions for the treatment of the mentally ill are not
consistent.5 5 In Rouse the patient argued that he should not be confined since he was receiving no treatment.';

Some states have passed

new mental health statutes setting out the civilly committed patient's
rights in regard to treatment.5

Many states, however, have not

changed their treatment provisions and probably will not do so until the
Supreme Court decides whether there is a constitutional right to treatment.58
The Florida statutes in effect at the time of Donaldson's commitment did not require that a person must be treated or released. Chief
Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion in O'Connor, concluded that
there was no historical basis supporting the view that a person must be
treated if he is confined to a mental institution. 0 States have the power
of parenspatriaewhich includes the duty to protect "persons under legal
disabilities to act for themselves." 60
The Fifth Circuit decided O'Connor on the issue of whether involuntary civilly committed mental patients had a guaranteed right to
treatment under the fourteenth amendment. The court held that there
was a constitutional right to treatment, and that Donaldson had been
deprived of treatment, 01 having been given only "milieu therapy,"02
which amounted to nothing more than custodial care.
53. 373 F.2d at 452.
54. Id. at 456.
55. Some statutes do not provide for treatment while others only have vague
references to treatment. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-17-5 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50,
H8 4201, 4423 (1969). There are also statutes providing for treatment to the extent that
funds and facilities are available. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 91 (1971).
56. Chief Judge Bazelon found that Rouse could not be forced to remain in
confinement unless he was provided with "adequate" treatment. 373 F.2d at 456.
57. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-B:42 to -44 (Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. §
88-502.3(a) (1971). The Florida mental health statutes were revised in 1971, and
amended in 1973 and 1974. Section 394.459 is concerned with the rights of patients,
including the right to individual dignity, right to treatment, and quality of treatment. The
criteria for involuntary hospitalization has been changed as well from the one contained
in the statute which was in force at the time of Donaldson's commitment.
58. Civil Commitment, supra note 31, at 1323.
59. 422 U.S. at 582 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
60. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (footnote omitted).
61. Three kinds of treatment were withheld from Donaldson. He was denied
grounds privileges, occupational therapy, and the right to talk to a psychiatrist. 493
F.2d at 513-14.
62. Milieu therapy is where "the hospital administration tries to make the total
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Civil commitment is only justified if the individual is dangerous to
63

himself or to others, or for the care and treatment of the individual.

When danger was not a factor and treatment was the only reason for
commitment, due process is violated if treatment is not provided. Treatment must be provided as the quid pro quo paid by society for depriving
64
an individual of his liberty in order to provide more safety to society.
CONCLUSION

O'Connor v. Donaldson was decided at a time when the fights of
mental patients were becoming an issue of growing importance. As a

result of this Supreme Court decision a person cannot be confined in a
mental institution involuntarily if he is not found to be dangerous to

himself or to others. A confinement of this sort would be a denial of
the individual's right to due process since he would be deprived of his

right to liberty.
This note has attempted to show some of the problems that still
exist in the area of involuntary civil commitments. Most mental health
statutes are still worded vaguely, even those that now set out the

patient's fights in regard to treatment. Statutes using vague terms that
are not adequately defined, such as "mental illness" and "dangerous-

ness," create problems as to what is necessary before a person can be
committed against his will.
The abolishment of involuntary commitment would not be a solution, since those individuals otherwise subject to parens patriae commit-

ments would not be able to make rational decisions in regard to
treatment or care that might be beneficial to them.65
living experience of the patient therapeutic."

G. DAVISON & J.NEALE,
544 (1974).

ABNORMAL

PSYCHOLOGY: AN EXPERIMENTAL CLINICAL APPROACH

63. 493 F.2d at 520.
64. Id. at 522. Three of the four federal district courts which considered this issue
held that there is a constitutional right to treatment. Two cases held that civilly
committed mental patients have a right to treatment. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F.
1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), on
Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill.
submission of proposed standards by defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
One case held that civilly committed mentally retarded patients have a right to
treatment. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
Another case held that there was no right to treatment, but the holding was reversed
without opinion after the Fifth Circuit's decision in O'Connor v. Donaldson. Burnham
v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319
(5th Cir. 1974).
65. Civil Commitment, supra note 31, at 1401.
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If society continues to commit persons using the criterion of "dangerousness," assuming that a point can actually be determined where
dangerousness to oneself begins, then under O'Connor actual dangerousness would have to be found before commitment in order not to
deprive a person of due process. Changing the standard to one of
"incapacity" would allow the state in its role as parenspatriae to commit
those persons who are incapable of any rational decision making, while
allowing to those individuals who are mentally ill but still capable of
making decisions the right not to be committed. Treatment would have
to be provided, however, to those committed, so that they might possibly
recover sufficiently to be able to care for themselves and be released.
The question whether there is a constitutional right to treatment
still remains unanswered. Mental health issues are very much in focus
today, and it is regrettable that the Supreme Court did not decide the
right to treatment issue when it had the opportunity to do so in
O'Connor.
Shawn M. Wold
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